

A Taxonomy of Approaches for Integrating Attack Awareness in Applications

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Introduction - Tolga Ünlü



- 1. Year PhD Student @ Abertay University, Scotland Supervisors: Dr. Lynsay Shepherd, Dr. Natalie Coull, Colin McLean
- PhD Research Project: Investigating Attack Awareness within Web Applications
- Research Interests: Application Security, Usable Security for Developers, Deception Technology

Agenda

- Problem Statement
- Attack Aware Applications
- Integration Approaches
 - Developer-Driven
 - Agent-Driven
- Discussion
- Conclusion & Future Work

The Security Blind Spots of Applications

Applications are often built without a means of **observing and reacting to security events as they occur.** [1][2]

This has the following consequences for applications that are blind towards security events:

- Attackers probing as they wish \rightarrow Finding exploitable vulnerabilities
- In Production: No measure of effectivity of security controls
- In Production: No measure of validity of the threat model
- Incident Response: Missing forensic evidence

Attack-Aware Applications

Attack-aware applications detect and respond to attacker activities in real-time through **embedded detectors** [3] or **detection points** [1].

Detectors: Security controls that check for **indicators of attacker activity**.

```
if(attack_indicator){
    log("Attacker activity detected!");
    respond();
}
```

Attack-Aware Applications

The **application context** can be utilized to define a set of observable attack indicators for application-level intrusion detection [4].

In the current context:

- What actions are possible?
- Which values can a user provide?
- What is the expected exec. order of actions?
- Should this action be executed at all?
- Which user roles are required for the actions?


Determine and Monitor Security Invariants

"X must always be true/false"

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Approaches for Attack Awareness Integration

Guidance for researchers and developers to determine the appropriate solution based on their technical and usability requirements



Developer-Driven Integration

The integration of attack awareness is done manually by the developers of an application

Manual Integration

Detectors are directly implemented in the application code

Aspect-Oriented Programming

Detectors are implemented as "aspects"

 \rightarrow Run aspect before/after function of interest @ runtime

- + Utilization of Application Expertise and Frameworks
- + Business Logic Attack/Probing Detection
- + Usable Security Control Format
- Additional Task for Developers
 Security Expertise Required for Certain Attacks (e.g. Injection Attacks)
- Manual / Limited Automation

Agent-Driven Integration

The integration of attack awareness is done automatically by a software agent on behalf of the developer

Runtime Environment Instrumentation

Software agent is part of the runtime environment \rightarrow Affects all running applications

Binary Instrumentation

Software agent injects detectors into an applications binary code

- + Low Setup Cost (Plug & Play)
- + Automatic Injection Attack Detection
- + No Code Modification Required
- Inadequate Detection Techniques
- Platform/Technology Specific
- Inadequate in Certain Environments

Discussion

Detectors for business logic attacks and probing behavior need to be manually implemented due to their custom nature.

\rightarrow Detecting a few distinct attacker probes could be sufficient to mitigate further attacks

Detectors for these:

- Are a few lines of code at most (including response logic)
- Don't introduce significant complexity
- Are performant as they execute only when attackers run into them

But requires **manual development** and is an **additional task on top of others.** [5]

Conclusion & Future Research

Attack awareness can be integrated in applications using a developer-driven or agent-driven approach.

Further research will focus on reducing the integration effort and aligning the integration with common practices.

Utilizing Application Frameworks and their Components

- \rightarrow Form the Basis of many Applications
- → Reusable Components for Common Practices (e.g. Integrating Attack Awareness via Dependency Injection [6])
- \rightarrow Mitigations within the Framework increase Applications Security [7]
- \rightarrow Frictionless for Developers

Thank you!

Contact, Feedback, Collaboration: tolgadevsec.github.io

References

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